Legal Aspects of Convict Labor by Schwartz, Arthur H.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 6
1925
Legal Aspects of Convict Labor
Arthur H. Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Arthur H. Schwartz, Legal Aspects of Convict Labor, 16 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 272 (May 1925 to February 1926)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF COINVICT LABOR*
ARTHUR H. SCHWARTZt
[The following reprint will be interesting in view of the recent article by
Mr. Mohler on Convict Labor in this JouRxA.-Ed.]
Little doubt exists that the effect of a convict's engaging in useful
occupation is beneficial so far as the convict himself is concerned.'
Moreover, from an eonomic viewpoint, the failure to utilize convict
labor is sheer waste, the cost of which is cast upon the taxpayers. -
However, when we approach the effects of this labor upon industry,
we tread upon more controversial ground. Though when compared
with the total amount of labor engaged in industry, the importance of
convict labor seems insignificant, 3 its concentration in a few industries4
makes it a vital factor in those industries.
In the utilization of convict labor, the states have employed one or
more of six systems.5 Under the lease systemO the state gives the care
and custody of the convict to a lessee who obtains the benefit of the
convict's labor, the state reserving to itself the power to make rules for
the proper care and inspection of the quarters. Under the contract
system,7 as under the lease system, the contractor supplies the raw
*From Columbia Law Review, July, 1925.
lProfessor of Law, Columbia University.
'See F. H. Wines, "Punishment and Reformation" (1919), pp. 209-212.
2See E. S. Whitin, "Self-Supporting Prisons," Annals of the American
Academy of Political Science, May, 1924, p. 1. For judicial recognition of this
fact, see Ward v. City of Little Rock (1883), 41 Ark. 526, 531.
lIn 1923, the number of convicts engaged in productive labor was 51,799
(61 per cent of the total number of convicts). "Convict Labor in 1923" Bul-
letin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 372, p. 2. The value of the
goods aggregated $76,096,960. Ibid., p. 3.4 In 1923, \the outstanding industries affected were:
Boots and Shoes ................................... $ 5,686,619
Chairs, Tables, etc ................................. 2,913,793
Clothing .......................................... 22,507,523
Farming ......................................... 5,895,894
Coal M ining ...................................... 4,105,424
Binding Twine .................................... 5,588,372
"Convict Labor in 1923," op. cit., footnote 3, pp. 5-10.5 For historical studies of convict labor and a description of the various
systems see H. C. Mohler, "Convict Labor Policies" (1925), 15 Journ. of Crim.
Law and Criminology 522, 548-597; E. T. Hiller, "Labor Unions and Convict
Labor" (1915), 5 Journ. of Crim. Law and Criminology 851. For the various
statutes relating to prison labor see "Convict Labor in 1923," op. cit., footnote
3, pp. 169-265.
GThis system appears to have disappeared as far as Federal and State in-
stitutions are concerned. "Convict Labor in 1923," op. cit., footnote 3, p. 18.
7At present employed in Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. "Convict Labor in 1923," op. cit.,
footnote 3, pp. 19-23.
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material, carries the risk of profit and loss, and superintends the work.
But under this system, the responsibility for the care and custody of
the convict is on the state, which usually maintains the convict in a
state-kept institution. The authority over the convict is necessarily
divided. The piece-price systems differs from the contract system only
in that the state, in addition to caring for the convict, actually superin-
tends the work. Where the public account system9 is employed, the
state enters the field of manufacturing on its own account and sells in
the market as a producer. Under the state-use system,"0 articles pro-
duced by convict labor may be used only by the producing institution
or by other public institutions of the state. Finally, the public works
and ways system" permits the utilization of convict labor only in con-
nection with the construction and repair of the public works and ways.
No matter which one of these systems is employed, free labor has
to meet the competition of convict labor.1 2  Likewise manufacturers
employing free labor must necessarily face the competition of manu-
facturers employing convict labor.' 3  As long as the wage paid to the
convict remains, as it now is, materially less than that paid to the free
8At present employed in Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming. "Convict Labor
in 1923," loc. cit.
9At present employed by all except New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio and Wyoming. Ibid.
10 At present employed by all the states except New Mexico and Wyoming.
It is used exclusively in New Jersey, New York, Ohio and the Federal Govern-
ment. Ibid.
""Adopted in all the states except Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee
and Wyoming. Ibid.
'12For judicial recognition of this fact, see Ward v. City of Little Rock,
supra, footnote 2, pp. 531-2. Under the lease, contract, and piece-price systems,
free labor has to compete directly with convict labor. Even where the state-use
or public works and ways system is employed, free labor is affected since the
total demand for free labor is decreased. "Convict Labor in 1923," supra,
footnote 3, p. 1. Under the public account system, free labor does not meet
any direct competition. But the necessity of the private manufacturers meeting
the competition of the state must tend toward the decrease of the wages paid
free labor. For labor's viewpoint, see "Proceedings of the 44th Annual Con-
vention, American Federation of Labor (1924), pp. 43-44; E. T. Hiller, op. cit.,
footnote 5, p. 851.
'aThe competition is most direct where the state itself engages in industry.
Where a private manufacturer buys the labor of convicts he, in effect, enjoys
a subsidy and is able to quote prices which the ordinary manufacturer is usually
in no position to meet. Even under the state-use and public works and ways
systems. Drivate enterprise is affected since the total demand for its products
is decreased. For the manufacturer's viewpoint, see "Prison Labor Competition
v. Free Industry" (2nd ed.), issued by the International Ass'n of Garment
Mfrs., pp. 9-10; "Convict Labor in 1923," op. cit., footnote 3, pp. 107-166. For
judicial recognition of this .fact, see Pollock v. Mabey (1924), 63 Utah 377,
383-4, 226 Pac. 186.
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laborer, 14 both free labor and the employer of free labor must inevi-
tably be under a disadvantage.
It is therefore not surprising to find considerable opposition to the
utilization of convict labor. Attempts to check convict labor as such,
on constitutional grounds, have proved unsuccessful. It is well settled
that the state may compel the convicts to work.9 It is not a violation
of the constitutional prdhibition against "cruel and unusual punish-
ments."'1 As to one convicted after the passage of a statute providing
for convict labor, the sentence includes such labor. 17 But as to one con-
victed before the statute, there is a possibility that it may be considered
e.x, post facto and therefore ineffective s.8
The opposition therefore has been evidenced mostly by attempts to
curb convict labor indirectly. Statutes have been passed requiring the
labeling and branding of convict-made goods and the licensing of
dealers in such goods. Such statutes have not been passed upon by the
United States Supreme Court. Where it was sought to apply these
statutes to goods manufactured in other states, state courts held them
to be unconstitutional on the ground that they unduly interfered with
interstate commerce. 19  A statute is, a fortiori, invalid if it discrimi-
nates against goods produced by convicts in other states.20  The fact
that the goods are convict-made does not prevent them from being
' 40f 104 institutions canvassed, 53 reported that the convicts received no
compensation; 31 institutions paid $0.10 or less per day; 7 institutions paid
between $0.10 and $0.20 per day; 11 institutions paid between $0.20 and $1.50
per day. Extra compensation was given for overtask work. "Convict Labor
in 1923," op. cit., footnote 3, p. 15. It may be noted that the growing tendency
to throw the loss caused by personal injuries sustained in the course of employ-
ment upon the industry in which they occur by means of compensation laws
has not yet touched the prison industries. The injured convict may prosecute
his claim against the state only after permission is granted him by the state.
See Rept. of Prison Survey Committee (N. Y. 1920), chap. 9, "Wages and
Other Incentives and Compensation," pp. 119-132. A bill has been introduced
in the New York Legislature which would provide workmen's compensation
to prisoners sustaining injury while engaged in prison work. Assembly (1925),
No. 1939, Int. 1691.
'1Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Governor (1914), 115 Va. 865, 80 S. E. 753.
16State v. McCauley (1860), 15 Cal. 430; Mason & Foard v. Main Jellico
Mountain Coal Co. (1888) 87 Ky. 467, 9 S. W. 391.
' 7State v. Yandle (1896), 119 N. C. 874, 25 S. E. 796; Holland v. State
ex rel. Duval Co. (1887), 23 Fla. 123.
18See Ex Porte Hunt (1890), 28 Tex. App. 361, 363-4.
9People v. Hawkins (1897), 20 App. Div. 494, 47 N. Y. Supp. 56 aff'd
(1898), 157 N. Y. 1, 51 N. E. 257; Arnold v. Yanders (1897) 56 Ohio St. 417.
47 N. E. 50. A bill has been introduced in Congress, which if passed will
enable the states to regulate, by means of labelling, marking, branding, and
licensing, the importation of goods made by convicts in other states. H. R.
No. 10241, 67th Congr., 2d Sess. The constitutionality of this proposed law
is doubtful since it is based on the nature of the laborer and not on the nature
of the goods. Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529.
20People v. Hawkhs (1895), 85 Hun. 43, 32 N. Y. Supp. 524.
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proper articles of commerce.2 1 When applied to goods already in
existence, these statutes also seem to violate the state constitutional
provisions against the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law.22 Though a law will not be declared unconstitutional
under either the due process or discrimination clauses where the state's
police power is properly exercised, the protection of free labor from the
competition of convict labor has been held not to be a proper exercise
of the police power.2 3 Where an attempt was made to evade the above
holdings by a statute based on the taxing power, it was held that con-
vict-made articles were not a proper classification for the purposes of
taxation.24  Where, however, the law applies to articles to be made
within the state and concerning which no private individual has any
contract rights., it would seem to be constitutional, at least as far as
the first sale is concerned. Since the state may prevent its convicts
from working at all, it may impose the conditions under which the
labor of convicts may be employed or the goods produced by the con-
victs acquired. Inasmuch as such laws would not restrict the total
sales of convict-made goods to an extent great enough to compensate
for the substantial decrease in the value of the labor of the state's own
convicts, they will probably not prove of much importance. Though
the labeling and licensing laws have not met with much success, the
amount of convict labor has been substantially restricted in a few
states by statutory or constitutional prohibitions against trade instruc-
tion to convicts or the use of machinery by convicts. 2 5
It is fairly obvious that. some systems for the utilization of con-
vict labor are better than others and attempts have been made to abol-
ish the poorer ones. The lease system early proved a failure from a
humanitarian and criminological viewpoint .2  The desire of the con-
tractors to get as much out of the convict as they possibly could often
worked to the detriment of the convict's well-being. 7  The contract
2 See People v. Hawkins, supra, footnote 19, pp. 16-17; Arnold v. Yanders,
supra, footnote 19, p. 420.22People v. Hawkins, supra, footnote 19.
23See People v. Hawkins, supra, footnote 19, p. 9.24People ex rel. Phillips v. Raynes (1910), 136 App. Div. 417, 120 N. Y.
Supp. 1053 aff'd (1910), 198 N. Y. 539, 92 N. E. 1097. Motion for reargument
denied. 198 N. Y. 622, 92 N. E. 1097.25Manthey v. Vincent (1906), 145 Mich. 327, 108 N. W. 667, involved a
constitutional prohibition against the teaching of mechanical trades to convicts
except the manufacture of articles of which the ch;ef supply for home con-
sumption is imported. Kempf v Francies (1913), 288 Pa. 320, 86 Atl. 190,
involved a statute prohibiting the use of machines operated other than by hand
or foot power.
2GSee Mohler, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. 562-568.2
7See K. R. O'Hare, "Human Ostriches," The Nation, April 8, 1925, p.
377; see supra, footnote 6.
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system is open to similar objections.2 8  Moreover, these systems are the
ones which cause convict labor to come most directly into competition
with free labor.
29
Many states have attempted to abolish the leasing or contracting
of convict labor. 30 The question has therefore arisen whether a con-
tract calls for the furnishing of convict labor or the furnishing of
goods to be produced by convict labor. The problem may be ap-
proached from either of two angles. It is possible to regard these
constitutional provisions as attempts to restrict direct competition with
free labor. 31 If the state supplies the capital, exercises control, bears
the risk of profit and loss, and is regarded in the contract as the enter-
priser, or if a majority of these elements are present, the state is the
true enterpriser and is the one who actually engages the convict labor.
If, however, a majority of the enumerated factors are found on the side
of the private individual, he is the one for whom the convicts are work-
ing. This "enterpriser" approach has been followed by some cases.
3 2
including the recent one of Rice v. State ex rel. Short (Okla. 1925),
232 Pac. 807. On the other hand, it is possible to regard these con-
stitutional provisions as attempts to abolish the inhumanities attendant
upon the lease and contract systems and to hold valid any contract so
long as the state has control and supervision of the undertaking.
3 3
The performance of contracts involving convict labor or products
of convict labor is affected by the fact that the state is one of the
28 Supplement to the Senate Journal, 39th Legis. Tex.), "Report of the
Penitentiary Investigating Committee, March 19, 1925.
29 See supra, footnote 12.
3 0There are constitutional prohibitions against the lease and contract sys-
tems in California, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Washington. The contract system is either regulated or abolished
in Alabama Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and Wyoming.
3 1 Green v. Jones (1924), 261 S. W. 43.
32 Price v. Mabey (1924), 62 Utah 196, 218 Pac. 725. In this case, the com-
pany was under a duty to furnish raw materials and machinery and to supervise
the work. The court therefore held the contract invalid. But see Henry v.
State (1905), 87 Miss. 1, 53, 39 So. 856, where the individual supplied the
capital, the state had control, and both were in a position to gain or lose. In
addition the contract spoke of the individual's paying for the "labor of the
conv~cts." It would therefore seem that the enterprise was that of the indi-
vidual. Nevertheless, the court held that the contract did not call for the sale
of convict labor. The same contract again came before the court and was given
the same interpretation in Henry v. State (1905), 87 Miss. 125. 151-2, 40 So.
152. In Broinwell Brush & W. G. Co. v. State Board of Charities (D. C. Ky..
1922), 286 Fed. 737, an attempt to circumvent the provisions against leasing and
contracting under the guise of providing manual training was unsuccessful.
3 3 Utah Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mabe, (1924) 63 Utah 374. 226 Pac. 189. Tn Green v.
Jones, supra, footnote 31, this view was expressly repudiated.
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parties to such contracts. Since it is considered contrary to public
policy to prevent the state from altering the nature of the penal system,
if, acting in a governmental capacity, it does make a change in the
penal system, the private contractor has no remedy if it involves a
breach of contract.3 4  If, however, the state attempts to breach the
contract otherwise than by a change in the penal system, the private
contractor may obtain specific performance. It has been urged that
state expenditures for facilities to enable convicts to labor when such
labor results in products which are sold to private individuals is a
diversion of public funds for private purposes. They have, however,
been held proper on the ground that the primary purpose was a public
one, namely, to provide employment for the convicts and that the sale
to private individuals was only incidental.36 It has been held in a
recent decision 37 that contracts for the sale of the products of convict
labor are not "in restraint of trade" nor the granting of a "special
privilege."
Opponents of convict labor are looking with favor upon a plann
which would provide a variation of the state-use system. Under it, by
agreement between states, certain industries which have a ready and
stable market among public institutions would be allocated to the vari-
ous states and the sale of products of convict labor would be limited to
such institutions . 3  The possible objection that such statutes would be
in violation of the constitutional prohibition of agreements and com-
pacts between states40 may be obviated by procuring the consent of
Congress.
34Jones )ollow Ware Co. v. Crane (1919), 134 Md. 103, 106 Atl. 274
(specific performance); Roach & Co. v. Ewing (1874), 55 Mo. 101 (specific
performance) ; see Porter v. Haight (1873) 45 Cal. 631, 638 et seq. Of course
such a contract does not interfere with the Governor's pardoning power. See
State v. Bank (1889), 66 Miss. 431, 437, 6 So. 184.
35Georgia Penitentiary Cos. Nos. 2 and 3 v. Nelms (1883), 71 Ga. 301.3"Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Governor, supra, footnote 15; Rice v. State ex
rel. Short (Okla., 1925), 232 Pac. 807.
37Rice v. State ex rel. Short, supra, footnote 36.
3sSee Initial Conference, Committee on the Allocation of Prison Industries,
National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor, p. 12; Frayne, "Prison Labor
and Society," Address at the Biennial Convention, General Federation of
Women's Clubs, June, 1922.
3 This market is supposed to have a potential buying power of $700,000,000.
See Frayne, op. cit., footnote 38, p. 4.
4 See Virginia v. Tennessee (1893), 148 U. S. 503, 520-1.
